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THE DOCTRINE OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES AS APPLIED
IN REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
The convenience of a plaintiff who seeks judicial review of federal
administrative action is best served by allowing the suit to be maintained in
his local judicial district. However, in situations where the place of suit
is not provided for by statute, local review I may be barred. The doctrine
of sovereign immunity requires these suits to be brought against administrative officials as individuals, rather than as representatives of the Government,2 and thus the party theories applicable to private suits are extended
to review of administrative action. If suit is instituted only against the
subordinate whose conduct directly affects plaintiff, the court may find that
the administrative superior is an indispensable party. The suit will then
have to be brought in the District of Columbia, where the court has jurisdiction over the principal officer of the agency by reason of his official
residence s and the requirement of the general venue statute 4 can be
fulfilled. 5
In strictly private suits, the difficulty of creating a general rule which
would minimize the handicaps and expense of litigating in a strange district
has led to the venue requirement that actions be brought in the district
where the defendants reside, thus placing the probable burden upon him
who initiates the proceeding. Similarly, inability to join a private party
whom the court deems indispensable to a definitive and fair resolution of
the controversy presents another difficult choice; but again the burden is
on plaintiff, whose failure to join an indispensable party will lead to dismissal of the suit.6
Whatever their merit in private litigation, application of these requirements to suits for review of administrative decisions produces an
1. The terms "local" and "locally" will be used in this Note to mean "outside the
District of Columbia."
2. See text at and following note 62 infra.
3. Personal service on an officer or agency of the United States is required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) (5). See Trost v. Ewing, 13 F.R.D. 432
(W.D. Pa. 1953). Process other than a subpoena does not extend beyond the

territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held except "when a
statute of the United States so provides." FED. R. Crv. P. 4(f).
4. "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of

citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside,
except as otherwise provided by law." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1952).
5. The development of the subject matter of this Note through the years may be
traced in 4 U. OF Cmr. L. REv. 342 (1937) ; Notes, 50 HARV. L. Rav. 796 (1937), 50
YAix L.J. 909 (1941), 23 IND. LJ. 305 (1948), 54 COL. L. REtv. 1128 (1954).
6. Often quoted is the general definition of indispensable parties expressed in
Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 139 (U.S. 1855): "Persons who not only have
an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree
cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy
in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity

and good conscience."

See Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1050 (1952), for discussion of

the application of the doctrine generally and in relation to administrative law; see
also 3 Moore, FFn AL PRAcTrcE 2144-55 (1948).
(238)
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inequitable situation. Centralization of review in Washington, D.C., handicaps the average plaintiff significantly as well as increases his expenses,
even though in the majority of cases judicial review is limited to the
record of a previous administrative proceeding. If new testimony of plaintiff or his witnesses can be introduced, the burden is even more severe;
the nominal right to review may prove financially infeasible. On the other
hand, the network of United States attorneys throughout the nation would
permit effective local presentation of the defense.7
These practical considerations have not been employed in judicial
formulation and application of the test for determining indispensability of
federal officials. Examination of the resulting procedural morass in several
classes of cases and of the unique capacity of the Government to defend
locally will form the basis for suggested remedial legislation to extend local
review to situations not covered by a special provision of the type found in
many major federal regulatory statutes.8

THE TEST OF INDISPENSABILITY: Williams v. Fanning
In Williams v. Fanning,9 decided in 1947, the Supreme Court set forth
the formula for determining the indispensability of federal officials. After
a hearing in Washington, D.C.,' 0 at which evidence was presented of
fraudulent practices in the business plaintiff conducted through the mail,
the Postmaster General signed a "fraud order" 11 directing the local post7. See text at and following note 84 infra.
8. Typical of special statutory provisions for review is that contained in the
Federal Trade Commission Act: "Any person, partnership, or corporation required
by an order of the Commission to cease and desist from using any method of competition or act or practice may obtain a review of such order in the court of
appeals of the United States, within any circuit where the method of competition or
the act or practice in question was used or where such person, partnership, or corporation resides or carries on business. . .

."

38 STAT. 719 (1916),

as amended, 15

U.S.C. §45(c) (1952). Basically the same pattern is found in the Securities Act of
1933, 48 STAT. 80 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1952); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 901 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1952) ; the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 834 (1935), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 79x (1952); the Federal Power Act, 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U.S.C.
§ 8251(b) (1952); the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 STAT. 978 (1935), as
amended, 27 U.S.C. §204(h) (1952); the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT.
455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1952) and the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 1065 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §210 (1952) as to certain
portions of their subject matter; the Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT. 831 (1938), 15
U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1952); the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 1024 (1938),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. 5646 (1952); the Food and Drugs Act, 52 STAT. 1055
(1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 371f (1952); a special provision granting local
review of certain orders by the Federal Communications Commission, by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act and the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, and by the United States Maritime Commission, 64 STAT.
1130 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 1034 (1952).
9. 332 U.S. 490 (1947).
10. See text at note 82 and note 82 infra for discussion of the importance of
decentralized administrative hearings.
11. 26 STAT. 466 (1890), 39 U.S.C. §732 (1952). Normally, the Postmaster
General relies on the findings and recommendations of subordinates. See text following note 86 infra.
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master in Los Angeles to refuse payment on any money orders addressed
to plaintiff and to stamp all letters "fraudulent" and return them to the
senders. Plaintiff's suit against the subordinate in the local district court
to enjoin enforcement of the order was dismissed for failure to join the
Postmaster General, though the judge commented that he found no
substantial evidence to support the superior's order.' 2 The circuit court
13
The Supreme
affirmed, following its earlier decisions in analogous cases.
Court's reversal was based on the following test: ". . . the superior officer
is an indispensable party if the decree granting the relief sought will require
him to take action, either by exercising directly a power lodged in him
or by having a subordinate exercise it for him." 14 The superior was
deemed not indispensable ". . . if the decree which is entered will effectively grant the relief desired by expending itself on the subordinate official
who is before the court." '5
6
The Court adhered to this formula in Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co.'
The Secretary of the Interior, after setting aside certain land and waters in
Alaska as an Indian reservation, promulgated a regulation which prohibited
commercial fishing in those waters except by natives or their licensees. The
district court enjoined a Regional Director of the Department of the Interior from enforcing the regulation against the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court held that the Secretary of the Interior was not an indispensable party
because, as in Williams, the superior would not have to perform any act
either directly or indirectly. An injunction against the Regional Director
would protect plaintiff from interference with its fishing and the threatened
seizure of its boats and equipment.
The Supreme Court qualified these decisions by emphasizing that the
decrees sought would not require active concurrence of the superiors. But
this fact would not have changed the practical result of these two cases:
freeing the plaintiffs from restraint and frustrating the regulatory efforts of
the department by prohibiting execution of a still outstanding order. Thus,
the Court's test places a premium upon procedural devices. Plaintiff may
utilize local review to nullify agency action only by carefully framing a
request for relief which will not require action by the superior. Close
analogy to Williams has resulted in the availability of local review in sub7
sequent cases involving postal authorities,' but the results in other types
of cases have been less consistent and less satisfactory.
12. Report of Proceedings in district court, Brief for Petitioner, Appendix p. 3,
on petition for certiorari, Williams v. Fanning, 331 U.S. 797 (1947).
13. 158 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1946). The earlier cases were Dolphin v. Starr, 130
F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1942) and Neher v. Harwood, 128 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1942).
14. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 493 (1947).
15. Id. at 494.
16. 337 U.S. 86 (1949).
17. See, e.g., Stanford v. Lunde Arms Corp., 211 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1954);
Pinkus v. Reilly, 170 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1948). But see Payne v. Fite, 184 F.2d 977
(5th Cir. 1950).
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Alien Deportation Cases.-The rule of Williams v. Fanning has had
frequent application in two types of cases involving aliens. In the first
class of cases, aliens seek review of deportation orders. Usually they challenge the factual basis of the administrative determination or charge that
procedural irregularities deprived them of their constitutional or statutory

rights.' 8
In Navarro v. Landon,19 an alien sued in the local district court to
enjoin the District Director from enforcing a deportation order issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, whose official residence is in Washington, D.C.s ° The superior was held not indispensable
since "the decree in order to be effective need not require the Commissioner
to do a single thing." 21 This was a correct application of the Supreme
18. These decisions remain valuable despite a subsequent Supreme Court holding in Heikidla v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), that the writ of habeas corpus was
the only proper avenue for protest of orders under the Immigration Act of 1917, 39
STAT. 874 (1917), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1946), so that the suits should
have been dismissed even if they had been initiated in the District of Columbia. In interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 STAT. 163, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 et seq. (1952), the Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and for the
District of Columbia have held that all the orthodox methods of judicial review are
now available. Pedreiro v. Shaughnessy, 213 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. granted,
23 U.S.L. WEEK 3133 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1954); Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d
449 (D.C. Cir. 1953), aff'd by an equally divided court, 346 U.S. 929 (1954). The
court relied on indications in the legislative background of the 1952 Act that § 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act was applicable, 60 STAT. 237 (1946), as
amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
Contra: Batista v. Nicolls, 213 F.2d 20 (1st
Cir. 1954).
Prior to these decisions, the availability of a wider scope of review under the 1952 Act was suggested in Developments in the La--Immigration
and Nationality, 66 HARv. L. REv. 643, 702 (1953), and in Note, 62 YALE L.J.
1000, 1006 (1953).
19. 106 F. Supp. 73 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
20. The Immigration Act of 1917 specified no administrative procedure and
directed only that certain classes of aliens "shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney
General, be taken into custody and deported." 39 STAT. 889 (1917), as amended,
54 STAT. 671 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 155 (a) (1946). Regulations provided for a hearing,
8 CODE FED. Rms. § 150.6 (1949), and for forwarding of the presiding officer's proposed findings and order to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization,
8 CODE FED. REs. § 150.9 (1949), who was authorized to issue the order of deportation; this however, could be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, 8

CoDE FED. REms. § 90.3 (1949).
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 does outline certain procedures,
including a provision that a "special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings . . .
to determine the deportability of any alien, and . . . as authorized by the Attorney
General, shall make determinations, including orders of deportation." 66 STAT. 209,
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1952). A substantial change has been made in the regulations.
Whereas formerly the officer who presided at the initial hearing only recommended
an order to the Commissioner, the order of the special inquiry officer is now final,
8 CODE FED. REGs. § 2 4 2 .61(e) (1952), unless appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals, 8 CoDE FED. REGs. § 6.1(b) (1952). Since the Commissioner seems to have
been removed from the direct line of these decisions, presumably the members of the
Board of Immigration Appeals are the officials who will be claimed to be indispensable in most of the deportation order cases under the 1952 Act. However, the
Commissioner is still the official to whom the Attorney General may delegate "any
and all responsibilities and authority in the administration of the Service and of [the
Immigration] Act," 66 STAT. 173, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1952), and, in a recent case
involving a deportation order under the 1952 Act, the Government argued that the
Commissioner and the Attorney General were the indispensable parties. See Pedreiro
v. Shaughnessy, 213 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1954).
21. 106 F. Supp. 73, 76 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
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Court formula and recently, in Pedreiro v. Shaughnessy,2 2 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the same result.P
However, most cases have held the Commissioner indispensable.2 4 The
approach of those courts which have articulated the basis for distinguishing
Williams is typified by Paolo v. Garfinket,25 which emphasized the following language from Williams: "if the decree which is entered will effectively
grant the relief desired by expending itself on the subordinate official who
isbefore the court," 26 the superior need not be joined. In Williams, an
injunction against the local subordinate would provide effective relief because plaintiff would probably confine his business headquarters to the one
judicial district. But an alien would be less likely to restrict his movements to a single district, and thus the Paolo court reasoned that an injunction not binding in every district could not afford effective relief. This
draws an unwarranted limitation from the language of Williams; the
sounder conclusion was expressed in Navarro v. Landon:
"This court may not compel the plaintiff to anticipate that he will
change his residence to another district and be confronted by an order
of the Commissioner directing the director of that district to deport
him. The term 'relief desired' as used in Williams v. Fanning can
only mean relief desired by the plaintiff. . . . If the defendant de22. 213 F2d 768 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. granted, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 3133 (U.S.
Nov. 16, 1954). Apparently the grant of certiorari embraces the indispensability
issue as well as the basic question, discussed in note 18 supra, of availability of review by means other than habeas corpus.
In attempting to demonstrate that the District'Director's functions in the matter
were not of a purely ministerial nature, the circuit court opinion ascribed
undue significance to a change in the regulations whereby that officer is authorized
to issue a warrant of deportation and make determinations incidental thereto. Issuance
of the warrant is required in "any case in which an order of deportation becomes
final," 8 CoDE FED. REGs. § 243.1 (1952), and the determinations referred to consist
of designating the country to which the alien will be deported and deciding who shall
pay the expense. This does not constitute participation by the District Director in the
basic order of deportation which the alien challenges. A more significant change to
indicate a decentralization of authority is that described in note 20 supra whereby the
decision of the Special Inquiry Officer on the order of deportation is now final, subject
to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
23. The following cases are in accord with Navarro and Pedreiro: Yanish v.
Phelan, 86 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Yanish v. Wixon, 81 F. Supp. 499 (N.D.
Cal. 1948); ef. Torres v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Cal. 1953); United
States ex rel. Cammarata v. Miller, 79 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); see Ragni
v. Butterfield, 115 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
24. Rodriguez v. Landon, 212 F2d 508 (9th Cir. 1954); Paolo v. Garfinkel,
200 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1952), affirming 106 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Pa. 1952) ; Belizaro
v. Zimmerman, 200 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Slavik v. Miller, 184 F.2d 575 (3d Cir.
1950) ; Podovinnikoff v. Miller, 179 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1950); Corona v. Landon, 111
F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1953) ; McKenzie v. Shaughnessy, 15 F.R.D. 146 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) ; Birns v. Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, 103 F. Supp.
180 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Medalha v. Shaughnessy, 102 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y.
1951). In Connor v. Miller, 178 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1949), a petition for review of a
deportation order was dismissed on the ground that the district court had no jurisdiction over the Attorney General or the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, who were named as defendants.
25. 200 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1952).
26. Id. at 281. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 494 (1947).
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sists in his efforts to deport the plaintiff, the matter is at an end. That
is all the relief the plaintiff seeks." 27
A second argument urged as demonstrating the Commissioner's indispensability points to the nature of a District Director's duties in arresting
and deporting an alien: "This is the ministerial act of a subordinate officer.
An attack on it could not bring up for determination the validity of the
warrant of arrest and of the orders of the Commissioner under which a
particular district director might take the deportee into custody." 28 Of
course, this overlooks the equally ministerial duties of the local postmaster
in Williams, a point which the Government stressed in that case, asserting
that he did not participate in issuance of the order and might not even
know its basis.29
In the second class of deportation cases, plaintiff does not contest his
status as a deportable alien but seeks only the privilege of suspension of
deportation, which lies within the discretion of the Attorney General.30
In Chavez v. McGranery". the court recognized a constitutional right of
plaintiff to a judicial hearing of his allegation that denial of procedural due
process had deprived him of the exercise of the Attorney General's discretion. However, the ultimate holding was that a decree requiring the
Attorney General to exercise that discretion could not be granted by a court
with no jurisdiction over him. This presents an enlightening contrast in
treatment of the Willhams test by the same district court which, in Navarro
v. Landon,32 did not deem the superior indispensable to enjoining the execution of a simple deportation order. Both Williams and Navarro were distinguished validly because the desired decree ordering the exercise of discretion "requires affirmative action on the part of the District Director's
superior." 3
27. 106 F. Supp. 73, 75-76 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
28. Corona v. Landon, 111 F. Supp. 191, 195 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
29. Brief for Respondent, p. 37, Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490 (1947).
One of the Department's trial examiners conducts the initial hearing. 39 CoDn FF.
REGS. § 151.4 (Cum.Supp. 1953). See text at note 88 infra.
30. Immigration Act of 1917, 39 STAT. 889 (1917), as amended, 54 STAT. 671
(1940), 8 U.S.C. § 155(c) (1946). Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66
STAT. 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1952). Again, as in the case of orders of deportation,
see note 20 supra, the change in regulations now makes final the order of a Special
Inquiry Officer denying suspension of deportation, 8 CoDE FED. RFGs. §§244.2,
242.61(e) (1952), unless appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, 8 CoDa
FED. REGS. §6.1(b) (1952). Under the 1917 Act, the Presiding Inspector merely
forwarded a memorandum of findings to the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization, 8 CODE FED.REGS. § 150.10(g) (1949).
31. 108 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
32. 106 F. Supp. 73 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See text at note 19 s.upra.
33. Chavez v. McGranery, 108 F. Supp. 255, 258 (S.D. Cal. 1952). The contrast
in treatment of the two classes of cases is emphasized further by the disposition of
Navarro v. Landon in a later proceeding. After the first decision involving only the
injunction against deportation, the alien filed an amended complaint admitting his
deportable status and requesting an order to compel suspension of deportation. The
court held him ineligible for suspension, but said the complaint as amended should
be dismissed anyway for the same reasons given in Chavez v. McGranery. Navarro
v. Landon, 108 F. Supp. 922 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See also, Torres v. McGranery, 111
F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
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In Vaz v. Shaughnessy 34 the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
that he met the statutory eligibility requirements for suspension of deportation. It was suggested that full relief could be granted by enjoining the
District Director from enforcing a deportation order until the Immigration
and Naturalization Service reopened the hearings and gave plaintiff an
opportunity to apply for suspension. This would achieve the same result
of keeping the alien in the country, by the same means, preventing the local
officer from arresting and deporting him, as in Navarro. The idea was
rejected in Vaz because the court accepted the authorities which regard
the superior as indispensable for review of any deportation order; but, if
the rationale and methods of Williams are accepted, an injunction could be
utilized to circumvent indispensability objections in the "suspension" cases.
Although one might anticipate reluctance of courts to intervene to any
great extent in a matter left by statute largely to administrative discretion, the issues involved in the "suspension" cases discussed did not differ
significantly from those in the simple deportation order cases,3 5 and the
36
opinions did not advance the discretion factor as a basis for distinction.
Even in somewhat distinguishable "suspension" cases,3 7 where plaintiffs
challenged the manner in which discretion had been exercised, the primary
determination should have been the extent of judicial review to be allowed.
Any remedy sanctioned should have been available to the aliens in their

local judicial districts.
34. 112 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 208 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1953).
35. In the deportation order cases, plaintiff claimed usually that the administrative
decision was clearly erroneous or was the result of unconstitutional procedure.
As to the suspension cases, the issue in Chavez v. McGranery, 108 F. Supp.
255 (S.D. Cal. 1952), is stated in text following note 31 upr. In the second
Navarro v. Landon case, 108 F. Supp. 992 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (see note 33 supra) in
Vaz v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 208 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.
1953), and in Coelho v. Perlman, 115 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), the plaintiffs
claimed that the circumstances under which they filed aliens' applications for relief
from military service should spare them the usual consequences of ineligibility for
United States citizenship, by the terms of the Selective Training and Service Act of
1940, 54 STAT. 885 (1940), as amended, 50 U.S.C. A',. §303 (1952), and the resultant ineligibility for suspension of deportation under the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 STAT. 889 (1917), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 155 (1946). Navarro
claimed he was not a "resident neutral alien," the class subject to military service
under the selective service act, at the time he applied for exemption. Vaz contended
that he had not understood the legal consequences of claiming exemption. The precise
basis of Coelho's complaint is not stated in the report.
36. The circuit court opinion in Vaz v. Shaughnessy, 208 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1953),
did not rely on the discretion aspect, but in Pedreiro v. Shaughnessy, 213 F.2d 768
(2d Cir. 1954), the court said its holding in Va "seems distinguishable, as the Vaz
case involved an attempt by a concededly deportable alien to review an order holding
him not eligible for suspension of deportation, essentially a discretionary matter,
whereas here petitioner seeks a review of the record on which is based a final order
of deportation, on the ground that his constitutional rights have been infringed."
Would the second circuit find sufficient basis for distinguishing the Chavez v.
McGranery situation solely in the fact that it involved "essentially a discretionary
matter," even though the alien alleged denial of procedural due process? See text
following note 31 and note 31 supra.
37. Avila-Contreras v. McGranery, 112 F. Supp. 264 (S.D. Cal. 1953) ; SavalaCisneros v. Landon, 111 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Cal. 1953).

1954]

INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IN JUDICIAL REVIEW

245 *

In evaluating the utility of the deportation cases for analysis of the
Williams rule, one must consider the Congressional tendency to be relatively ungenerous in the rights accorded aliens, as compared to citizens,
and to limit severely aliens' right to judicial review of immigration officials'
decisions s However, the opinions discussed in this section are phrased in
terms incompatible with the notion that the courts welcomed any plausible
ground for warding off the plaintiffs. To the extent that lack of sympathy
with aliens or fear of flooding the courts with a multitude of similar pleas
may have prompted use of the indispensable party rule as a device of
expediency, the deportation cases assume importance of another and somewhat different character. There could be no more mischievous way of disposing of the cases than by developing a complex body of procedural law,
thus raising possibly false hopes that a remedy is available in the District of
Columbia, and certainly distracting legislators, judges, and attorneys from
working out a realistic balance between aliens' rights and the exigencies of
necessary regulation.
Government Employment Cases.-A number of cases have interpreted
Williams as requiring dismissal of local suits for reinstatement to government employment in the typical situation where authority to restore persons
to the payroll is vested solely in superior officers 3 9 On the other hand,
two decisions by local district courts have enjoined subordinates from discharging employees during the pendency of administrative appeals. 40 Before discussing the Second Circuit's reversal of one of these latter cases,
Reeber v. Rossell,41 it is well to examine carefully Blacknur v. Guerre,4
the 1952 Supreme Court decision upon which the circuit court relied.
38. "[R]ead against . . . [the] background of a quarter of a century of consistent judicial interpretation, § 19 of the 1917 Immigration Act . . . clearly had
the effect of precluding judicial intervention in deportation cases except insofar as
it was required by the Constitution." Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234-35
(1953) (see note 18 supra). Section 19 stated: "In every case where any person
is ordered deported from the United States under the provisions of this Act, or of
any law or treaty, the decision of the Attorney General shall be final." 39 STAT.
889 (1917), as amended, 54 STAT. 671 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 155 (1946). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 STAT. 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1952), contains
practically identical language, but court interpretation of the legislative history has
broadened the scope of review. See note 18 supra.
39. Money v. Wallin, 186 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1951); Daggs v. Klein, 169 F.2d
174 (9th Cir. 1948); Callaway County Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
Comm. v. Missouri Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Comm., 122 F. Supp.
541 (W.D. Mo. 1954); accord, Angilly v. United States, 199 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.
1952), affirming 105 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); see Henry v. Newman, 110
F. Supp. 955 (E.D. Pa. 1953). Money and Daggs cited a regulation and a statute
respectively which vested in the superior even the authority to discharge.
40. Reeber v. Rossell, 91 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Farrell v. Moomau,
85 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1949). But cf., McGrimley v. Foley, 89 F. Supp. 10
(D. Mass. 1950), aff'd, 180 F.2d 1022 (1st Cir. 1950) (plaintiffs had a weak case
on the merits) ; Martucci v. Mayer, 210 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1954) (cited only Blackmar
v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952), see text at note 42 infra).
41. 200 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1952). After the superior was held not indispensable,
91 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), the district court gave summary judgment for
defendants on the merits, 106 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The circuit court modified this judgment, holding that the district court had no jurisdiction to pass on the
merits in the absence of the superior.
42. 342 U.S. 512 (1952).
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Blackmar had been removed from his position as a minor executive
in the New Orleans office of the Veterans' Administration and the discharge was given final affirmance by the Board of Appeals and Review
of the Civil Service Commission. Plaintiff then instituted suit in a federal
district court in Louisiana, naming as defendants both the Veterans' Administration's Regional Manager and the United States Civil Service Commission.

He sought judgment "annulling his discharge . . . and the

. . and declaraction of the Civil Service Commission confirming [it]
ing that 'plaintiff is entitled to an order from the United States Civil Service Commission directing . . . [the Regional Manager] to restore plain-

tiff to his aforesaid position' with back pay."
affirmed dismissal on the grounds that:

4

The Supreme Court

"Since the members of the Civil Service Commission were never
served, and could not be served, in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, and the Civil Service Commission is not a corporate entity, it follows that the only defendant before the court was
[the Regional Manager] . . . and, as we have pointed out, no relief

could possibly be granted against him in these proceedings ..
Had the Williams test been applied, plaintiff would have been barred
by virtue of his own petition for an order from the Commission, since the
decree granting the relief sought would require the superiors to take action.
In view of this complete consistency of Blackmar with Williams on the
facts, and the failure to enunciate a conflicting rule or even to mention the
latter case, there seems to be no substantial basis for a construction of
Blackmar which would remove from the area of permissible local review
those instances which Williams would authorize.
In the Reeber case, 45 the plaintiff sued to enjoin the managers of the
Veterans' Administration's New York office from removing him from his
position or reducing him in rank or salary. He claimed that the local
officers relied on regulations, issued by the Civil Service Commission, which
denied him rights guaranteed by the Veterans' Preference Acts. 46 The
circuit court's brief opinion did not explain why Blackwr was considered
clear authority for the decision that the Civil Service Commissioners were
indispensable parties to the plaintiff's suit, which sought only relief against
subordinates. However, discussion of Reeber by the same circuit in a
subsequent opinion, Arbolino v. Shaughnessy,47 suggests the view of the
43. Id. at 513, 514.
44. Id. at 516. It is interesting to note that recently the plaintiff has been
awarded damages for loss of salary due to his discharge, because the procedural
requirements of the Veterans' Preference Act were violated in the course of his
administrative appeal. 120 F. Supp. 40& (Ct. Cl. 1954).
45. Reeber v. Rossell, 200 F2d 334 (2d Cir. 1952). See note 41 supra.
46. 37 STAT. 413 (1912), 5 U.S.C. 648 (1946), repealed, 64 STAT. 1100 (1950);
58 STAT. 387 (1944), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §851 (1952).
47. 204 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1953).
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factual situation which may have prompted that decision. It appears from
Arbolino that the court considered the functions of the local officials in
Reeber as amounting to no more than the transmission of the superiors'
orders, as distinguished from a physical act of independent significance
such as the actual impounding of mail by the local postmaster in Williams.
The most significant element of the discharge process, aside from
communication of the decision to the employee, is authorizing the necessary entries on the records to terminate payment of wages. It seems from
the facts as stated in the district court opinion that, in Reeber, the local
managers may have been the ones who would perform the mechanics necessary to remove plaintiff from the payroll. 48 If that was the fact, the only
practical distinction between this and the Williams situation would be that
in Reeber payments to plaintiff could have been cut off at a higher administrative level with relative ease even if the local managers had been enjoined from taking the initiative, whereas in Williams it would have been
very difficult to intercept plaintiff's mail before it reached the local post
office. The situations would be even less distinct as to the portion of the
relief sought in Williams which consisted of an injunction against refusal
to pay money orders, since theoretically the Post Office Department could
have placed the local postmaster in a crossfire by refusing to credit his
accounts for payments made to the plaintiff.
However, in situations where the employee has already been discharged, normally a superior is the party who must act to reinstate him.49
The rule applicable to reinstatement cases is extremely important, since
frequently an employee's petition to enjoin immediate discharge will be
dismissed until exhaustion of administrative remedies has been demonstrated by adverse decision on an appeal within the agency's organization. °
There is not the same degree of intricacy and conflict in the employment
decisions as a whole as in the deportation area, primarily because even a
generous interpretation of Williams rarely would permit local review.
Also, the limited authority of the courts outside the District of Columbia
to grant mandatory relief poses another formidable, though undesirable,
barrier.61 There would be occasionally a practical basis for peremptory
48. The local managers made the initial designation of the particular employees
who had the lowest veterans' preferences and thus were to be discharged in order
to effectuate the general order of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs that the
office force be reduced. See 91 F. Supp. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Even if the
formal functions of discharge would be executed by a superior, it would most likely
be by the Administrator of Veterans! Affairs rather than by the Civil Service Commissioners, since the latter had approved the discharge and were not exercising their
authority to order different disposition of a case by the employing agency. See 5
CODE FED. RGs. §§ 22.10, 22.11 (Cum. Supp. 1954).
49. See note 39 supra.
50. See, e.g., Leeds v. Rossell, 101 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Breiner v.
Wallin, 79 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
51. See McGrimley v. Foley, 89 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1950), aff'd, 180 F.2d
1022 (1st Cir. 1950). See also, Reeber v. Rossell, 91 F. Supp. 108, 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) and Farrell v. Moomau, 85 F. Supp. 125, 126 (N.D. Cal. 1949), in which even
courts willing to enjoin discharge of employees expressed doubt as to their authority
to order reinstatement. See text at and following note 75 infra.
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dismissal of employees' suits for specific relief, as, for instance, when discharge was prompted by belief that the holder of a confidential post was
a security risk; but, to whatever extent employees are to be allowed appeal
to the courts, they should not be hampered by unreasonable jurisdictional
obstacles.
Other Areas of Decision.-Despite special provision for local review
in a great many of the major federal regulatory statutes, 52 the problem of
interpreting Willians has arisen in a variety of contexts in addition to
postal regulation, deportation, and government employment. The interpretation has been liberal but reasonable in those cases which resolved
On the other hand, some decithe issue in favor of the private party.1
sions have given a distinctly restrictive interpretation which falls short of
realization of the potential of the Williams rule.54 A similar illiberal
52. See note 8 supra.
53. See Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin, 208 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1953) (enjoined
local collector of customs from acting under an order of the Bureau of Customs to
prohibit importation of certain merchandise) ; Koepke v. Fontecchio, 177 F2d 125
(9th Cir. 1949) (enjoined Area Rent Director from establishing and enforcing maximum rentals for premises which the court held were not subject to control under
the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, contrary to the Housing Expediter's regulations) ;
Belcher Oil Co. v. National Enforcement Comm'n, 114 F. Supp. 377 (N.D. Ga.
1953) (enjoined local officers from continuing hearings and making findings on a
complaint issued by the National Enforcement Commission charging violation of the
Defense Production Act of 1950); Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal.
1953), referring to analysis of Williams at an earlier stage of the Parker case, 98
F. Supp. 300 (enjoined local Coast Guard officers from enforcing any final order of
the Commandant of the Coast Guard excluding plaintiffs from employment as merchant seamen on the ground that they were security risks, unless the administrative
procedure preceding the final order was conducted in accordance with the court's
directions; the decision goes very far in permitting local review, since the regulations
provide that the Commandant must approve the security clearance papers of a seaman before he can be employed, 33 CoDE FED. RFGs. §§6.10-1, 121.13(c)

(Cum.

Supp. 1953)); Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (court asserted
its jurisdiction to enjoin local officials of the Bureau of Reclamation from diverting
river water in carrying out a Bureau project, but dismissed without prejudice for
insufficient evidence); National Radio School v. Marlin, 83 F. Supp. 169 (N.D.
Ohio 1949) (regional finance officer of the Veterans' Administration *was delaying
tuition payments to plaintiff school on the ground that a compromise settlement of
certain claims against the Administration required the approval of the national
Comptroller in addition to that previously given by other officers of the agency;
court granted preliminary injunction against sending the tuition vouchers to the
District of Columbia office for a ruling, and directed that the regional officer transmit
them to the local office of the Department of the Treasury for immediate payment
in accordance with the usual practice; apparently a specific order of a superior was
not involved). See also, Jeager v. Simrany, 180 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1950), which
enjoined a subordinate from conducting a hearing preliminary to cancellation of an
alien's certificate of lawful entry. The court relied on a test which was used frequently prior to Williams, that a local official may be enjoined from executing an
order which the superior lacked authority to issue.
54. See Arbolino v. Shaughnessy, 204 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1953) (suit to enjoin
district personnel officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service from transferring certain security officers of the Service from the New York district to a
Texas district in accordance with an order of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization; note, however, the court's rationale that the only function of the
local officer was to communicate the superior's order, whereas in Willians the local
postmaster had been performing positive physical acts in withholding mail); Smart
v. Woods, 184 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 936 (1951) (suit to
enjoin Area Rent Director from enforcing an order of the Housing Expediter
denying appeal from Area Director's original order establishing maximum rentals
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tendency appears in a few cases which distinguish between a petition for a
declaratory judgment and a petition seeking merely injunctive relief.55
Finally, in some situations plaintiffs have been unable to meet the Williams
test because, just as in the suspension of deportation and employee reinstatement cases, the manner in which internal chains of administrative
command were stated by the applicable statute or regulation posed a formal
requirement of affirmative action by a superior.5 6
under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947; did not cite Williams) ; Forrest Harmon
& Co. v. Rottgering, 106 F. Supp. 993 (W.D. Ky. 1952) (suit to obtain temporary
restraining order against Area Rent Director's enforcement of rent reduction orders
pending completion of plaintiff's administrative appeal); American Communications
Ass'n v. Schauffler, 80 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (suit by union to enjoin
Regional Director from conducting an election scheduled by the National Labor
Relations Board in which the union's name was excluded from the ballot because of
its failure to file affidavits indicating that there were no Communists among its
officers; the court stated that an effective decree would require the Board to take
action, because, if the basis of the union's exclusion was held unconstitutional, the
union's petition for representation would then be a valid one which the Board would
be required by statute to investigate) ; White v. Douds, 80 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) (involved substantially the same facts as American Communications Ass n v.
Schauffler, stpra, and relied on a quotation from that opinion; here, however, the
plaintiff requested, in addition to an injunction, an order directing the National Labor
Relations Board to provide for a hearing); Rogers v. Skinner, 201 F.2d 521 (5th
Cir. 1953), reversing 100 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Tex. 1951) (suit to enjoin Regional
Director of the Department of Labor and his investigators from advising plaintiff's
employees that they were within the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act
and from encouraging them to institute suit to enforce these alleged rights; the
opinion cited Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952), see text at note 42 et seq.
supra, for its conclusion that the Secretary of Labor was indispensable, but did not
cite Williams). See also, Interstate Reclamation Bureau v. Rogers, 103 F. Supp.
205 (S.D. Tex. 1952).
55. In Cha-Toine Hotel Apts. Bldg. Corp. v. Shogren, 204 F2d 256 (7th Cir.
1953), a petition for a declaratory judgment that certain premises were not subject
to rent control under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 was dismissed on the
ground that a decree not binding on the superior could not terminate the controversy.
The court emphasized that plaintiff intended to use a favorable decree as estoppel
by verdict in any subsequent proceedings, and distinguished the result in Williams
as not constituting authorization that the superior's order be "vacated by direct
judicial review." This underestimates the practical effect of the decision in Williams,
for there the plaintiff was freed from any further interference on the basis of the
same charge unless the Postmaster General were to flaunt a judgment on the merits
for plaintiff and appoint a succession of new local postmasters. May v. Maurer,
185 F.2d 475 (10th Cir. 1950), also held that the superior was indispensable when
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that premises were not subject to rent
control, even though plaintiff spelled out, in addition, a request that an Area Rent
Director be enjoined from issuing orders. A third example is Carson v. Meador,
120 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Cal. 1954), which dismissed a petition for a declaratory
judgment that plaintiff was entitled to release from all federal parole supervision.
See also, Jacobs v. Office of Housing Expediter, 176 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1949) and
Bryant v. Rucker, 111 F. Supp. 309 (S.D. Ala. 1953), in which petitions for declaratory judgments alone were dismissed, although the courts did not indicate that the
result would be different if only an injunction were sought.
Contrast with the above decisions numerous cases which have granted injunctions
although the plaintiff sought also a declaratory judgment: e.g., Pedreiro v. Shaughnessy, 213 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1954) and Navarro v. Landon, 106 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.
Cal. 1952) (alien deportation cases; see text at notes 22 and 19 supra) ; Croton
Watch Co. v. Laughlin, 208 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1953) (prohibition of importation of
merchandise; see note 53 supra) ; Koepke v. Fontecchio, 177 F2d 125 (9th Cir.
1949) (rent control case; see note 53 supra).
56. See Berlinsky v. Woods, 178 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 949 (1950) (sought decree ordering the national Housing Expediter to exercise
the authority vested in him by the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 to institute pro-
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None of the indispensability decisions can be viewed in their proper
perspective without considering the fact that they lie in the area in which
Congress has not made provision for judicial review. Since the avail5
ability of review, and its scope, are the product of decisions by the courts, 7
an important and perplexing issue as to the finality to be accorded the administrative action underlies many of the cases. It is quite likely that in
some of the cases an attitude unfavorable to the plaintiff in this regard
exerted significant influence on the decision to dismiss.5 8 In addition, with
the exception of the alien deportation and Government employment areas,
all but three 5 9 of the decisions denying local review sustained other grounds
ceedings for an injunction against plaintiff's eviction, which was alleged to be in
violation of the Act); Sellas v. Kirk, 101 F. Supp. 237 (D. Nev. 1951), aff'd, 200
F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1953) (sought to enjoin a local
officer's reduction of size of herds plaintiff was permitted to graze on public lands,
but this would have required the Secretary of the Interior to formulate a new basis
of allocation to replace the one which the plaintiff challenged).
In some situations, the nature of the relief sought would necessitate affirmative
action by the superior: Fahey v. O'Melveny and Myers, 200 F.2d 420 (9th Cir.
1952) (this decision was incident to underlying suit described by plaintiff as a
quasi in rem action to determine title to bank deposits impounded when the Home
Loan Bank Board abolished one bank and established another; the basic suit sought
to review this reorganization indirectly, and thus the court lacked jurisdiction because effective relief would require the Board to reactivate the first bank, appoint
new officers, and redistribute banks among various districts); New York Technical
Institute of Maryland v. Limburg, 87 F. Supp. 308 (D. Md. 1949) (suit to enjoin
regional officers of the Veterans' Administration from refusing to comply with
demands of plaintiff school for tuition payments at rates disapproved by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs; this relief would amount to requiring the Administrator to approve the higher payments, since as a practical matter it would be
necessary to credit the account of the local officer for disbursements to plaintiff;
compare this with National Radio School v. Marlin, 83 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ohio
1949), note 53 supra).
Also, unskillful phrasing of complaints has occasionally emphasized the mandatory nature of the relief requested: e.g., Hospoder v. United States, 209 F.2d 427
(3d Cir. 1953) (requested that the Veterans' Administration be ordered to grant
a rehearing on plaintiff's disability claim) ; Feyerchak v. Hiatt, 7 F.R.D. 726 (M.D.
Pa. 1948) "(writ of mandamus to compel warden of a federal penitentiary to provide
plaintiff with proper medical care or a transfer to a medical center).
57. See DAVIs, ADMINISTRATVE LAW 812-67 (1951).
58. For example, compare the government employment decisions discussed in
text at notes 39-51 supra, with the extremely limited scope of review asserted in
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), and the cases there cited. Compare Hospoder v. United
States, 209 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1953), note 56 supra, with Fletcher v. Veterans Administration, 103 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Mich. 1952), which held that the statute applicable to the two cases, 48 STAT. 9 (1933), 38 U.S.C. § 705 (1952), made the
decision of the Veterans' Administration final; see the same conclusion as an alternate
holding in New York Technical Institute of Md. v Limburg, 87 F. Supp. 308 (D.
Md. 1949), note 56 supra. Compare the NLRB case, American Communications
Ass'n v. Schauffier, 80 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1948), note 54 supra, with White v.
Douds, 80 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), note 54 supra, which relied in the alternative on nonreviewability of the question. See Sellas v. Kirk, 101 F. Supp. 237
(D. Nev. 1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1952), note 56 supra, in which the
alternate holding was that the action was nonreviewable because committed solely
to agency discretion.
59. See Arbolino v. Shaughnessy, 204 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1953) and Smart v.
Woods, 184 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1950), both note 54 mspra; Bryant v. Rucker, 111
F. Supp. 309 (S.D. Ala. 1953), note 55 supra.
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for dismissal, most frequently sovereign immunity 0 or failure to exhaust
an administrative remedy.6 1 Resolution of these and other underlying
issues would be facilitated by eliminating from consideration the distracting
and confusing indispensable superior dispute.
DOCTRINAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE INDISPENSABLE

SUPERIOR RULE

Sovereign Immunity.-Though not specified in the Constitution, immunity of the Federal Government from suit, in the absence of Congressional consent, has developed firm authority in judicial decision 62 and has
been a significant factor in the extension of the indispensability doctrine
to suits for review of official action.
Its first and basic effect has been to give continuing stimulus to the
concept that these cases constitute suits against the officers as individuals,
rather than as representatives of the Government's interest in balancing
the rights of the public in general against those of a particular plaintiff.
This patent fiction is necessary in the present state of the law to reconcile
with the language of sovereign immunity decisions any substantial degree
of judicial supervision of administrative action, where judicial review of a
particular agency is not authorized specifically by statute.63 The language
of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.6 4 would permit unconsented suits for restraint of federal officials only when plaintiff can demonstrate that the official has acted beyond the statutory limits of his authority
or that the statute or order which confers authority is unconstitutional,
the theory being that in these situations the conduct complained of is individual, not sovereign, action. On its face this would bar a plaintiff
whose principal objection was to an asserted lack of substantial evidence
to justify an order, rather than to an over-reaching of statutory authority
. 60. See Payne v. Fite, 184 F2d 977 (5th Cir. 1950), note 17 sipra; Rogers v.
Skinner, 201 F2d 521 (5th Cir. 1953), reversing 100 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Tex.
1951), note 54 supra; Hospoder v. United States, 209 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1953),
Fahey v. O'Melveny and Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 454 (9th Cir. 1952), and New York
Technical Institute of Md. v. Limburg, 87 F. Supp. 308 (D. Md. 1949), all note
56 supra.
61. See Forrest Harmon & Co. v. Rottgering, 106 F. Supp. 993 (W.D. Ky.
1952) and White v. Douds, 80 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), both note 54 supra;
May v. Maurer, 185 F.2d 475 (10th Cir. 1950) and Carson v. Meador, 120 F. Supp.
260 (S.D. Cal. 1954), both note 55 supra.
62. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949);
Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945) ; Minnesota v. United
States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939) ; and other cases cited in appendix to dissenting opinion
of Frankfurter, J., in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., supra, which
appendix includes also a great many cases illustrating the parallel doctrine of immunity of state governments.
See also HAr AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTs AND THE FEDmAL SYxSEM
1150-80 (1953); Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Iminunity Doctrine, 59 HARv. L. Rxv. 1060 (1946); Notes, 40 GEO. L.J. 289 (1952),
65 _A{v. L. Rnv. 466 (1952).
63. Even the liberal review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60
STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952), has not eliminated the problem, as is indicated by the statement in Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 516 (1952), that the
Act is not to be deemed an implied waiver of all governmental immunity from suit.
64. 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949).
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or a constitutional defect. In practice, both the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts often have acceded to the theory that an administrative
order, determined to have been unsupported by sufficient evidence, represents an act which was beyond the authority of the officer." Also, only
rarely has the Government's immunity been decisive against a plaintiff in
a Supreme Court case unless he asserted a claim to public funds or Government-held property.6 6 This suggests strongly that the decisions turn
primarily on the firm pragmatic basis articulated in Land v. Dollar:67
"The 'essential nature and effect of the proceeding' may be such as to make
plain that the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury
or domain, or interfere with the public administration. .

.

. If so, the

suit is one against the sovereign." 68 Still, the fiction of suits against
officers as individuals remains an integral part of the expressed rationale
of the leading decisions, including Land v. Dollar. When the issue shifts
to the locale of a concededly permissible suit, this hinders frank recognition of the mere representative capacity in which the official stands as
defendant, and deters realistic analysis of the situation in terms of the Government's ability to defend locally with relative ease.
Sovereign immunity has played a second important role through
its influence on the form in which the Williams test was cast. The Williams opinion described the circumstances of three Supreme Court cases 69
which held a superior indispensable and which, the opinion said, evolved the
principle that he was indispensable if the decree would require his affirmative action.7" Only one case was cited in which the Court had found a
superior not indispensable, Colorado v. Toll,71 but it was said to have
brought the above-mentioned principle "into clearer relief." 72
"There the director of national parks had issued regulations forbidding
operation in the Rocky Mountain National Park of automobiles for
hire. Toll was the superintendent of the park who was enforcing the
regulation. A suit to enjoin him was allowed to be maintained without joining his superior, the director, who had promulgated the regulation.

That result followed . .

.

by analogy to those cases which

permit a suit against a public official who invades a private right either
65. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 13740 (1951) ;Land v.Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947) ; Croton Watch Co. v.Laughlin,
208 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1953); Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 463, 474 (S.D. Cal.
1954). But see the statement in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682, 690 (1949), that a claim of error in the exercise of delegated authority
is not sufficient to permit suit.
66. See cases cited note 62 supra. But see, Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918);
Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627 (1914).
67. 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
68. Id. at 738.
69. Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28 (1897); Gnerich v.Rutter,
265 U.S. 388 (1924); Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507 (1925).
70. For critical comment on the Court's interpretation of these cases, see HART
AND WEcHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

71. 268 U.S. 228 (1925).
72. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 493 (1947).

1189-90 (1953).
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by exceeding his authority or by carrying out a mandate of his superior.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U.S. 605, 619, 620. In those situations relief against the offending
officer could be granted without risk that the judgment awarded would
'expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the
public administration.' Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738." 73
Actually, Toll disposed of the indispensability issue quite cursorily;
the principal problem was one of federal-state conflict over control of roads
within the Park. Likewise, the Lee, Stimson, and Dollar cases, cited in the
above quotation from Williams, revolved solely around aspects of the
sovereign immunity of the United States. Although the Williams opinion
described the result in Toll on the question of indispensability as following
by analogy to these cases, the analogy is true only within the context of
the fiction of suits against officers as individuals. Viewed more realistically,
the practical considerations which should govern a decision on sovereign
immunity differ considerably from those which are most relevant to determining whether a plaintiff should be limited to suing in the judicial district
of a superior's official residence. The former should depend upon a judgment as to whether the probable repercussions on public property or the
administration of law justify total denial of relief; logically, the latter question should not be examined until it is decided that plaintiff does have a
right to sue, and then the crucial problems are limited to such factors as
the ability of the Government to defend locally, the necessity for the
superior's participation in the suit, and, should his participation happen to
be necessary, the likelihood of undue interference with performance of his
official duties if he was required to appear in a local district.
Williams does, however, foster a true kinship of theory between the
sovereign immunity and indispensability cases by engrafting a second fiction upon that of regarding a suit for review as directed only against an
individual officer. 74 When the petition can be framed to fit the Williams
test, it is to be treated as involving only the subordinate. Likelihood of
excessive interference with public property or the administration of law
is a valid consideration in review of administrative action, but this substantive issue is merely beclouded by analysis of suits as against individual
73. Ibid.
74. Merger of language and reasoning of the sovereign immunity and indispensable party doctrines was not new with Williams. Often, dismissal of an action
had been phrased in terms of the indispensability of the United States as a party
and the bar against joining it. See, e.g., Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal,
326 U.S. 371, 373 (1945); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386 (1938);
Block, op. cit. supra note 62, at 1065-66.
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11 (1949),
provides an example of the parallel between the two doctrines: "Of course, a suit
may fail, as one against the sovereign, even if it is claimed that the officer being sued
has acted unconstitutionally or beyond his statutory powers, if the relief requested
cannot be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but
will require affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably
sovereign property."

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

254

[Vol. 103

officers. The confusion is compounded by further extension of analogous
conceptualism through the doctrine of indispensable superiors.
Limited Authority to Grant Relief in the Nature of Mandamus.-A
second factor impeding review of administrative action has been the lack
of authority in the federal district courts outside the District of Columbia
to issue original writs of mandamus. 5 The problem has not been affected
by Federal Rule 81(b), which eliminated the writ of mandamus from the
federal procedural system but provided for the grant of equivalent relief
in the same circumstances. 76 In practice, the courts often circumvent their
lack of authority by granting a mandatory injunction to accomplish the

purposes of mandamus,"" although theoretically this practice is barred by
an early Supreme Court holding 78 that the equivalent of mandamus, which
was historically a remedy "at law," cannot be obtained in equity.
Thus, any prayer for relief which exceeds the limits of Williams by
seeking to compel affirmative action by a superior also is vulnerable, except
in the District of Columbia, on orthodox doctrine that the court has no
power to grant relief in the nature of mandamus. This has, in fact, been
held an alternate ground for dismissal in a number of cases finding a
superior indispensable.1 9 Further, strict interpretation of the mandamus
ban would prevent a local district court from compelling even a subordinate
to take affirmative action, and would bar the result in the Williams case
75. McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 503 (U.S. 1813), provided the basis for this
denial of original mandamus jurisdiction by interpreting § 14 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, [see 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1952) and Legislative History] as delegating the
power of mandamus only to the extent necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction obtained initially by the courts on an independent ground. Kendall v. United States,
12 Pet. 524, 618-25 (U.S. 1838), noted the absence of the problem of federal-state
allocation in interpretation of the authority of District of Columbia courts, and found
the source of a broader mandamus power in the common law jurisdiction of Maryland, which they inherited, and in the provisions of an 1801 statute. This development is analyzed in HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
See also DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW 761-63 (1951).
SYSTEm 1180-87 (1953).
The same authorities outline the general limits on the scope of mandamus, e.g., to
order "ministerial" but not "discretionary" action.
A considerable number of statutes permit all federal courts to exercise authority
in the nature of mandamus as an aid to enforcement of certain of their provisions.
These are listed in Note of the Advisory Committee to FED. R. Cirv. P. 81(b), 28
U.S.C.A. (1950).
76. "Relief heretofore available by mandamus . . . may be obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in these
rules." This does not effect an increase in the jurisdiction of the district courts.
See Marshall v. Crotty, 185 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1950); Commentary, 2 FED. RULES
SmwV.676 (1940).
77. See Note, 38 CoL. L. REv. 903 (1938) ; HART AND WECHSLER, op. Cit. Mipra
note 75, at 1186.
78. Smith v. Bourbon County, 127 U.S. 105 (1887).
79. See McGrimley v. Foley, 89 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1950), aff'd, 180 F.2d
1022 (1st Cir. 1950); Callaway County Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
Comm. v. Missouri Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Comm., 122 F. Supp.
541 (W.D. Mo. 1954); New York Technical Institute of Md. v. Limburg, 87 F.
Supp. 308 (D. Md. 1949); Feyerchak v. Hiatt, 7 F.R.D. 726 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
See also Reeber v. Rossell, 91 F. Supp. 108, 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) and
Farrell v. Moomau, 85 F. Supp. 125, 126 (N.D. Cal. 1949), discussed in note 51
supra.
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itself, since it is difficult to distinguish the presumably unavailable remedy
of ordering the postmaster to deliver mail and pay money orders from the
relief which was held to be permissible, enjoining him from refusing to
deliver and pay.
Actually, both the territorial limitation on the power to compel direct
exercise of official authority as the primary relief granted, and the unique
power of the District of Columbia court, are derived from historical circumnstances, rather than from consideration of the current problems of judicial review s0 There is no adequate reason for limiting plaintiff to suing
in Washington, D. C., simply because the relief sought would require
affirmative action by a superior. The case against a plaintiff who protests
official action can be presented effectively in his own district. 8' Normally
there should be no difference in this respect solely because the decree will
require affirmative action. Certainly it is preferable to deny plaintiff local
relief only in an exceptional situation where an effective defense cannot
be made locally, rather than to enforce an unnecessary general ban. Of
course, in some cases the real objection may be that the mandatory nature
of the relief sought threatens excessive interference with Government
activity. But then the basic issue should be only whether suit is to be permitted at all, not whether it should be limited to a particular court.
THE EQUITIF-S OF LOCAL REVIEW

To determine the crucial issue of whether judicial review of federal
administrative action should be centralized or localized, it is necessary to
examine the practical consequences of each alternative. In most cases, since
an administrative hearing has preceded the order protested, judicial review
is limited to the paper record; thus the expense of transporting plaintiff
and witnesses to the District of Columbia is not involved. However, substantial handicaps remain. Very likely, plaintiff was represented by counsel
8 2
during the administrative proceeding, which is usually decentralized,
80. See note 75 supra.
81. See text following note 84 infra.
82. Decentralization of administrative proceedings is, of course, extremely important, since it is at this stage that the plaintiff is required ordinarily to introduce
the testimony or other evidence upon which he bases his protest. As would be expected, in situations where there is special statutory provision for local judicial
review, see note 8 supra, either the statute or the regulations of the agency involved usually specify also that hearings be located with consideration to the convenience and necessity of the parties. See, e.g., 17 CODE FED. REGS. §201.3(b)
(1949) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 41 STAT. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C.
§ 792 (1952) (Federal Power Commission).
Even in the situations with which this Note is concerned, in which judicial
review was not specified by statute, the agencies' regulations usually provided that
hearings be localized, at least on a regional basis. The Post Office Department,
which formerly limited its hearing to Washington, D.C., as was the case in
Williams v. Fanning, see text at note 10 supra, has amended its regulations recently
to permit transfer to another location. "The hearing examiner shall grant or deny
such application having due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties."
39 CoDE FED. REGs. § 150.414(b) (Cum. Supp. 1954). Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F.
Supp. 463 (S.D. Cal. 1954) voided a fraud order on the ground that, in view of this
regulation, it was a denial of "administrative procedural due process" to refuse to
transfer the hearing to Los Angeles, the plaintiff's place of residence.
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and he will be forced either to lose the services of the attorney most familiar
with his case or to sustain the expense of the attorney's trip to the District
of Columbia. If plaintiff retains new counsel in Washington, there will be
probable added expense to compensate a local attorney for making the
contact and corresponding with the new attorney to familiarize him with
the case. Also, preparation of the argument may be hindered considerably
if communication is limited to correspondence, and this lack of personal
contact with his attorney may serve to intensify plaintiff's apprehension.
When extensive introduction of new evidence would be permitted,8 3
and review is limited to the District of Columbia, the expense of transporting and maintaining himself and witnesses poses a severe arid perhaps
insuperable handicap for all but unusually affluent plaintiffs. Even for a
moderate size business, it can be a considerable financial setback. The
only alternative is reliance on the less forceful technique of depositions.
In contrast to the burdens on the plaintiff in the above types of situations, the Government is assured of effective legal representation. It has
at its disposal, in addition to separate legal departments of many agencies, 4
the United States Attorney for each judicial district and the 485 authorized Assistant United States Attorneys 85 distributed among the districts.
83. This would be most likely when there is no prior administrative hearing
at which plaintiff's case can be presented with reasonable completeness, as when
Department of Labor officials attempt to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act,
against an employer; see Skinner v. Rogers, 100 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Tex. 1951),
rev'd, 201 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1953). Another example is 46 CODE FED. REGS.
§2.01-70 (1952), which provides only for filing of a written statement of grounds
of appeal from enforcement of the Steamboat Inspection Laws; see Bryant v. Rucker,
111 F. Supp. 309 (S.D. Ala. 1953). Again, in Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin, 208
F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1953), the district court assumed jurisdiction before the controversy reached the Customs Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1583 (1952), and at this stage
plaintiff presumably would have had an opportunity only to file a written protest
with the local collector of customs as provided in 19 CODE FED. REGS. § 17.1 (1953).
See also Carson v. Meador, 120 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (petition for relief
from federal parole supervision); Fite v. Payne, 91 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Tex. 1950)
(protest of local postmaster's classification of an area as residential); Feyerchak v.
Hiatt, 7 F.R.D. 726 (M.D. Pa. 1948) (petition by federal prisoner for improved
medical care).
Consider also the importance of evidence extrinsic to the adminstrative record,
if plaintiff bases his protest on violation of his statutory or constitutional rights by
the procedure which the agency followed.
84. The functioning of the Department of Justice in cooperation with administrative agencies was described as follows by Homer Cummings, then Attorney
General of the United States: "Departments and other types of federal agencies have
their own attorneys for the daily tasks of administration, such as the preparation
of legal memoranda and the rendition of informal opinions. . . . Where imporant
questions of law or differences of opinion arise, they are customarily referred to the
Department of Justice. In cooperation, attorneys of other departments or agencies
often assist the Attorney General or district attorneys in litigation.
"Greater variety of experience, increased resources, more numerous assistants,
and the nation-wide network of district attorneys, marshals, and special agents
versed in the local practice before the courts and local conditions have been made
available to all government agencies through the Department of Justice." CUMMINGS
AND McFARLAND, FEDERAL JusTicE 490-91 (1937).
85. See letter from Robert W. Minor, Acting Deputy Attorney General, dated
October 29, 1954, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania. For
expression of opinion by courts that the Government could effectively defend locally,
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However, by hypothesis, decentralization would increase the total number
of suits. Although some of the legal staff perhaps could be shifted from
the District of Columbia, there probably would be need for an increase
in the number of Government attorneys. It does not seem, however, that
the added cost need be very great even in absolute terms, and, compared to
present total public expenditure in providing administrative and judicial
hearing of allegedly improper agency action, the increase would be small.
In addition, decentralization presents an opportunity in at least some
situations to eliminate entirely, not merely shift, certain costs, such as the
expense attendant upon travel of a plaintiff and/or his witnesses. Witness
expense would be reduced to a minimum, since the nature of the issues in
the indispensability cases indicates that the important witnesses usually
are located relatively near the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff's appearance
in court would often be important, rarely would there be a need for superior
administrative officials to participate personally. In many of the areas in
which the indispensability question has arisen, the principal officer of the
agency plays a minor role in the actual administrative determination, and
that only in the last stages. As an example of this "institutional" method
of decision,8 6 the statute authorizing postal fraud orders specifies that the
Postmaster General shall issue them "upon evidence satisfactory to him"; 11
actually, his approval of an order is based entirely on findings of fact and
88
recommendations of a hearing officer and the Solicitor of the Department,
and no doubt the latter himself relies heavily on his numerous assistants.
There is little reason to believe that the Postmaster General gives more
independent consideration to the evidence in the average case today than
was shown by the opinion in, Pike v. Walker 89 to have been the practice
in 1941. There the Postmaster testified that he:
see, e.g., Pedreiro v. Shaughnessy, 213 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Report of Proceedings in district court, Brief for Petitioner, Appendix p. 4, on petition for certiorari,
Williams v. Fanning, 331 U.S. 797 (1947).
86. See, GELLHORN AND BysE, ADmna!iSTNARA
LAw 1073-134 (1954), for comprehensive analysis of the question through cases and other materials. See, COOPER,
ADmINisTRATIvE AGENCIES AND THE CouRTs 48-49 (1951): "The statute usually
bestows authority upon a commission or the head of an agency, but these individuals
cannot often perform personally the multifarious duties delegated to them ...
There arises by clear necessity, in all the larger agencies, delegation of discretionary power within the personnel of the agency."
"Regardless of the [legal] limits on delegation to agency employees to pass
finally upon matters of importance the fact remains that power to recommend the
decision in any matter can be and ordinarily is so delegated. The distinction is more
technical than practical. The higher officers are so little inclined to reverse the
determination of their subordinates that the latter's recommendation often carries
the weight to sway and determine final agency action in any close case, especially
where the determination relates not to a general policy but to the decision of a particular individual case."
See also, PARKR, ADmINiSTRATIvE LAW 101 (1952); Grundstein, Subdelegation
of Administrative Authority, 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 144 (1944).
87. 26 STAT. 466 (1890), 39 U.S.C. §732 (1952).
88. 39 CODE FED. REGS. § 151.25 (1949).
89. 121 F2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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.. satisfied himself that the recommendation had been signed
by the Acting Solicitor, and thereupon signed and issued the order.
He neither heard nor read any of the evidence, nor did he read or
consider the appellants' answer or the brief filed in their behalf, and
except that he 'glanced through several pages of the findings of fact
and recommendation and thereby acquainted himself with the nature
of the scheme,' he knew nothing of the controversy of his own knowledge." 90
Realistically, it would be impossible for the Postmaster General to give detailed personal attention to the great multitude of matters for which his
formal authorization is required by statute or regulation. 91 The same observation applies to the many other agency heads whose supervisory responsibility is both large and varied, for example, the Attorney General,
who has been held indispensable in proceedings for suspension of deportation, 92 or the Secretary of the Navy, held indispensable in suits for reinstatement of civilian navy yard employees. 93
Even if the superior's personal knowledge or judgment has been
controlling in a particular administrative decision, it should be possible normally to defend that decision effectively in the plaintiff's district.
In a deportation case, petition for reinstatement to employment, or other
typical suit, the vital issues demand evidence as to plaintiff's characteristics,
conduct, and analogous matters; there would be no necessity for the principal officer to participate personally in the proceeding. Of course, it would
be reasonable to require the plaintiff to sue in the District of Columbia if
he should insist that for his purposes personal appearance by the superior
officer is necessary. And, if the court should find that exceptional circumstances of a particular case require the superior's presence for effective
defense of the agency's position, again it would be reasonable to inconvenience the plaintiff in order to prevent serious interference with official
activities.
A possible consequence of decentralized review is that temporary or
permanent change in plaintiff's residence, after a successful protest of an
agency order, could bring up the question again in the new district and
produce an opposite result on the same facts. Examples would be aliens
whose deportation had been enjoined 94 or merchant seamen whose exclu90. Id. at 38.
91. See Post Office Dep't, REP. ATr'y GEN. Comm. AD. PRoc. 39-40 (1940).
Duties supposedly committed to the personal attention of the Postmaster General
range from comprehensive reformation of postal rates and classifications, if necessary
to prevent excessive loss on service, 43 STAT. 1067 (1925), as amended, 45 STAT. 942
(1928), 39 U.S.C. § 247 (1952), to establishing "in places where . . . in his judgment, the public convenience requires it, receiving boxes for the deposit of mail
matter. . . ." 39 CODE FED. REGS. § 50.17 (1949).
92. See cases cited notes 31-35 supra.
93. See Money v. Wallin, 186 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1951); Daggs v. Klein, 169
F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1948).
94, See cases cited notes 22 and 23 supra,
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sion from employment as security risks had been reversed. 95 However, the
administrative officials should feel bound by the decision of the first court,
at least as to that particular person, unless they can introduce significant
new evidence.
As to the properly anticipated increased discrepancy which would
arise as a result of interpretation of statutes and regulations and treatnent
of factual situations by various district courts and courts of appeals, the
normal unifying influence of the federal appellate system would operate to
adjust the differences. In addition, any serious amount of disruptive inconsistency in the arguments presented to the courts and the general
policies followed in the various districts could be .prevented by reasonably
efficient cooperation between the agency involved and the Department of
Justice, and within the latter.
Another argument against decentralization asserts that concentration
of review in the District of Columbia promotes a higher degree of judicial
expertise, which should in turn raise the quality of decision. It is extremely
doubtful, however, that the types of cases here involved demand a special
degree of expertness; their crucial issues seem, rather, to be of a type
similar to those with which federal judges are familiar.
The Government argued in Williams v. Fanning that it would be
handicapped if required to defend that kind of suit in the plaintiff's district,
because of the time necessary for the local Government attorney to forward
the complaint to the Department of Justice for authorization to defend, time
needed by the agency to examine the complaint and prepare affidavits, and
the customary failure to attach to the complaint for guidance of the local
attorneys a transcript of the record and findings of fact at the agency
hearing.96 All these objections are susceptible to easy remedy if a statute
authorizing local review conditioned it upon submission by plaintiffs of a
satisfactory record of the case to date and allowance of the slight additional
time which might be necessary for the Government because the suit was
not at the Capital.
The basic answer to these arguments against general decentralization
of judicial review is that any loss in the various respects claimed will be
more than outweighed by the gain to plaintiffs, not only from their personal
point of view, but also from the viewpoint of public interest in the fair
administration of justice.
LEGISLATION AS A SOLUTION

The limited mandamus authority of the local district courts would
continue to pose an obstacle to local review, even if the Supreme Court
were to abandon the Williams formulation and direct that no administrative official should be held indispensable unless his personal participation
in the suit was shown actually to be essential. If, as is likely, the Court is
95. See Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953); note 53 supra.
96. Brief for Respondent, pp. 51-55, Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490 (1947).
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not willing to change its approach so drastically, comprehensive legislation
is probably the only means of achieving general decentralization without
encouraging procedural manipulation in its most extreme form. In addition, legislation could establish a consistent procedure for all suits for review
not controlled by a specific statute, thus clearing the area of the haze of
fictions which have hindered plaintiffs and obscured the underlying substantive issues, and at the same time assuring adequate safeguards for
effective defense by the agency.
It is suggested that the following be added to Section 10(b) of the
Administrative Procedure Act: 97
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, no suit for
review of agency action brought in accordance with Section - of
the Judicial Code 98 shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over,
or improper venue as to, any officer or employee of the United States
or of any agency thereof, and a judgment in every suit so brought
shall be binding on the agency and on every officer or employee of the
United States or of any agency thereof.
The remaining suggested changes consist of provisions to be incorporated in the Judicial Code.9 9 For the purpose of these provisions,
"agency" and "agency action" should be defined to coincide with their
meaning in the Administrative Procedure Act; o'0
this involves a substan97. The provision could be added between the first and second sentences of the
present § 10(b). 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b) (1952). Section 10 reads
in part as follows:
"Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion(a) Right of review.-Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any
relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
(b) Form and venue of action.-The form of proceeding for judicial review
shall be any special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in
any court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable
form of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction. Agency action shall be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for such review is provided by law.
98. See text at note 99 infra.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1952).
100. "'Agency' means each authority (whether or not within or subject to review by another agency) of the Government of the United States other than Congress,
the courts, or the governments of the possessions, Territories, or the District of
Columbia. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to repeal delegations of authority
as provided by law." 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1952). The same

section excludes specifically from the major provisions of the Act "agencies composed of representatives of the parties to the disputes determined by them," "courts
martial and military commissions," "military or naval authority exercised in the field
in time of war or in occupied territory," functions conferred by certain legislation
scheduled to expire with the termination of World War II, and the functions conferred by the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, the Contract Settlement
Act of 1944, and the Surplus Property Act of 1944. "Agency" as used in the Judicial
Code should exclude any of these authorities which are still operative.
"'Agency action' includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 60 STAT. 238
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(g) (1952).
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tial change from the more conventional form of the general definition of
"agency" in the Judicial Code. 0 '
1. Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, every suit
for review of agency action:
(a) shall be brought against the agency; and
(b) may be brought only in the judicial district where the
party or any of the parties seeking review resides or carries on
business, or in the District of Columbia, or in the judicial district
in which the party or any of the parties seeking review has
appeared personally or by representation in a proceeding before
the agency or before any officer or employee thereof concerning
the action sought to be reviewed; and
(c) may be commenced only by filing in the district court a
petition' 0 2 for review of the agency action, which petition shall
contain a concise statement of the nature of the action as to which
relief is sought, the grounds on which relief is sought, and the
relief prayed; and by delivering a copy of the petition to the
United States Attorney for the district, or to an Assistant United
States Attorney or clerical employee designated by the United
States Attorney in a writing filed with the clerk of the court; and
by sending a copy of the petition by registered mail to the Attorney General of the United States; and by sending a copy of the
petition by registered mail to the agency whose action is sought
to be reviewed.' 0 3
101. "The term 'agency' includes any department, independent establishment,
commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any
corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context
shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense." 28 U.S.C.
§451 (1952).
Contrast with this the concept of the term "agency" as used inthe Administrative
Procedure Act:
'hoever
has the authority is an agency, whether within another agency or in
combination with other persons. In other words agencies, necessarily, cannot be
defined by mere form such as departments, boards, etc. If agencies were defined by
form rather than by the criterion of authority, it might result in the unintended inclusion of mere 'housekeeping' functions or the exclusion of those who have the real
power to act." H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1946).
"The word 'authority' is advisedly used as meaning whatever persons are vested
with powers to act (rather than the mere form of agency organization such as department, commission, board or bureau) because the real authorities may be some
subordinate or semidependent person or persons within such form of organization."
S N. R P. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1945).
102. The statutes making special provision for local review, see note 8 supra,
provide customarily that plaintiff file with the appropriate court a "petition" for review. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 3: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
103. To the extent applicable, this would supersede the existing provision for
service upon an officer or agency of the United States, which is stated in FE. R.

Crv. P. 4(d) (5).
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2. In every suit required to be brought in accordance with Section
1, the district court shall, upon motion of the United States Attorney
or the Assistant United States Attorney, grant such additional time,
not in excess of five days, for filing any pleading or motion as shall
appear dearly necessary by reason of unavoidable delay as a direct
consequence of conducting the suit in a judicial district other than that
in which is located the principal office of the agency whose action is
sought to be reviewed.
3. In every suit required to be brought in accordance with Section
1, each district court shall have the same authority as the District
Court for the District of Columbia to grant, on appropriate action or
motion, relief in the nature of mandamus.
4. (a) A district court may transfer any suit brought in accordance with Section 1, if it shall find that:
(1) because of exceptional circumstances the testimony of
the agency or of any member or members of the body comprising
the agency 104 is absolutely essential to effective defense of the
suit; and
(2) it is absolutely essential for effective presentation that
this testimony be introduced personally, rather than through
depositions; and
(3) personal appearance in the suit would interfere seriously
with performance of official duties by the agency or the member
or members of the body comprising the agency.
(b) The district court shall designate in its order of transfer
the district in which the suit may be brought, which shall be the district in which the agency or the member or members of the body comprising the agency perform the major part of their official duties, and
shall attach to the order a formal finding of fact as to the specific
circumstances upon which the transfer is based.
104. "Member or members of the body comprising the agency" also coincides
with the terminology of the Administrative Procedure Act. 60 STAT. 239 (1946),
5 U.S.C. §1004(c) (1952).

